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I .  I n t r o d u c t i o n
The American newspaper industry, often called “The Fourth 
Estate,” apparently believes it has fallen on hard times. The aristocrats 
of the Fourth Estate, the daily newspapers, came to the Ninetieth 
Congress seeking a boon: relaxation of the rigors of antitrust policy as 
applied to mergers and joint agency operations by otherwise competing 
newspapers. A bill has been introduced, S. 1312, which is sponsored by 
fifteen Senators of diverse political and economic views, all save one 
having one thing in common—the presence of newspaper joint agency 
operations in their home states.1 The very fact that Senators of such 
conflicting viewpoints could be brought together on an issue surely 
indicates that America’s Fourth Estate has political power far in excess 
of that normally associated with aristocracies in a democracy. 
Consequently, the political facts of life with regard to the power of 
newspaper publishers over the political fortunes of their communities 
suggest that S. 1312 is a bill that cannot be treated as special interest 
legislation which one might expect to see shunted aside in the committee 
process after a pro forma performance for the benefit of constituents. 
Happily, the Fourth Estate includes enough independent and responsible 
publishers who are concerned with the broad responsibilities of the press 
and the deeper implications of a free press so that there has been ample 
debate upon the pros and cons of S . 1312.
* Associate Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Utah, B.S. Boston College, 
LL.B. Georgetown University, S.J.D. University of Michigan.
1. S. 1312,90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) was introduced by: Senators Hayden (D.) and Fannin 
(R.) of Arizona (joint agency in Tucson); Senator Kuchel (R.) of California (joint agency in San 
Francisco); Senators Hartke (D.) and Bayh (D.) of Indiana (joint agencies in Evansville and Fort 
Wayne); Senators Bennett (R.) and Moss (D.) of Utah (joint agency in Salt Lake City); Senators 
Fong (R.) and lnouye (D.) of Hawaii (joint agency in Honolulu); Senators Monroney (D.) and 
Harris (D.) of Oklahoma (joint agency in Tulsa); Senator Randolph (D.) of West Virginia (joint 
agency in Charleston); Senator Scott (R.) of Pennsylvania (joint agencies in Franklin—Oil City 
and Pittsburgh); Senator Thurmond (R.) of South Carolina (no joint agencies in South Carolina); 
and, Senator Tower (R.) of Texas (joint agency in El Paso).
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II. T h e  B a c k g r o u n d  o f  S. 1312
The statistical history of the American newspaper industry provides 
some insight into the reason for the current attempt by some of the press 
to shed their mantle of rugged individualism and seek to relax the rule of 
competition in the industry. Newspapers witnessed a spectacular growth 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth 
century.2 In total numbers, circulation and revenues of daily and weekly 
newspapers achieved phenomenal growth between 1850 and 1910. In 
1850 there were 254 daily newspapers with a total circulation of
758.000.3 By 1890, there were a total of 1,610 dailies with a total 
circulation of 8,387,000. In 1909, there were 2,600 daily newspapers with 
a total circulation of 24,212,000.4 Thereafter, the total number of daily 
newspapers gradually declined while total circulation continued its 
steady growth. In 1920, there were 2,042 dailies with a total circulation- 
of 27,790,656; in 1940, 1,878 dailies with a total circulation of 
41,131,611;5 in 1960, 1,763 dailies with a total circulation of 58,882,000;6 
and, in 1965, there were 1,751 dailies with a total net paid circulation of
60.358.000.7 Thus, while total circulation and revenues have been 
steadily increasing, the total number of dailies has been steadily 
decreasing. Between 1940 and 1965 the total number o f morning dailies 
declined from 380 to 320, and during the same period the total number 
of evening dailies fell from 1,498 to 1,444} Only Sunday newspapers 
have shown a growth in total numbers during this period— from 525 to 
578.9
A superficial glance at these statistics and the realization that 
population, literacy, and affluence have been steadily increasing might 
suggest that the decline of the total number of daily newspapers is 
inexplicable. Inherent economic factors, competition of other media, 
and business practices especially peculiar to the newspaper industry, 
however, make the decline of the total number of dailies, in the face of 
increased circulation and revenues, understandable if  not defensible.
2. See generally K re p s , T h e  N e w s p a p e r  I n d u s t r y ,  T h e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  A m e r ic a n  
I n d u s t r y  509 (2rd ed. 1961); Note, Local Monopoly In the Daily Newspaper Industry, 61 Y a le  
L.J. 948 (1952). For an excellent survey of the growth and concentration of all major forms of mass 
communication media, see B. W. R u c k e r ,  T h e  F i r s t  F re e d o m  (1968).
3. H i s t o r i c a l  S t a t i s t i c s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  C o l o n i a l  T im es t o  1957, at 500 (1957).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Inherent econom ic factors m ake m odern, daily newspaper 
publishing an expensive process. Capital cost outlays in fixed assets for 
a modern, metropolitan, daily newspaper are quite high,10 in part at least 
because of the relative technological backwardness and oligopolistic 
control of the production equipment business. Newsprint has shown a 
steady and rigid increase in price," and wages have also been subject to 
steady increase, even though newspapers are still probably the largest 
employers of child labor in the form of “Horatio Alger” type newspaper 
boys.12 Although newspapers continually fight to maintain the illusion
10. Estimates of plant replacement costs and start-up costs for a major metropolitan 
newspaper vary considerably, depending upon the location, size of the newspaper, and technology 
adopted. Replacement costs for the Newspaper Agency Corporation of Salt Lake City, which prints 
two dailies of over 100,000 circulation each, were estimated to exceed $7,000,000. Hearings on S. 
1312 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly o f  the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 879 (1967) (statement of J. W. Gallivan) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. A  
paper was started in McAlister, Oklahoma, with a circulation of 8,500 and a photo offset cost of 
$150,000. 1 Hearings at 379 (statement of Gene Stipe). William D. Rinehart, Assistant General 
Manager of the American Newspaper Publisher’s Ass’n (ANPA) Research Institute, presented a 
general description of the technology available for new newspapers and its costs. See 2 Hearings 788, 
809.
The exact status of the desirability, utility, and cost of equipment to operate a newspaper were 
never clearly settled in the hearings. Some witnesses argued that improved technology and an 
inproved labor relations policy could substantially lower the start-up costs for new newspapers. 2 
Hearings 936-53 (statement of Dr. Harry Kelber); 2 Hearings 953-87 (statement of John R . 
Malone); 3 Hearings 1253-64 (statement of the International Typographical Union (ITU )). See 
also C om m , o n  F re e d o m  o f  t h e  P r e s s ,  A . F r e e  a n d  R e s p o n s ib le  P r e s s  30-37 (1947) (reprinted in
3 Hearings 1124-31).
It is interesting to note that the Report of the Royal Commission on the Press 1947-1949, 
perhaps the most thorough examination of the newspaper industry undertaken by any country, 
generally concluded that the greatest barriers to entry in the newspaper industry were finding a sure 
and reasonably priced supply of newsprint and achieving a stable and adequate number of 
advertisers early in the life of the new venture. R e p o r t  o f t h e  R o y a l  C om m . pt. 2, at 158-64.
11. The major cost of publishing a newspaper is newsprint. The average price per short ton of 
imported newsprint has risen from $93.13 in 1950 to $124.89 in 1965. S t a t i s t i c a l  A b s t r a c t  o f  
t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  354 (1967). The ITU reported that newsprint costs rose 236% between 1935 and 
1961 and that newsprint costs accounted for 29.7% of the income of a paper with 250,000 
circulation. 3 Hearings 1251. The price a buyer pays for a newspaper usually does not cover the cost 
of the paper on which the news is printed. See 2 Hearings 876-77 (statement of J. W. Gallivan). 
There have been several investigations of the newsprint industry probing pricing practices of sellers 
and the purchase of newsprint plants by large newspapers and chains. See generally E l l i s ,  
N e w s p r in t :  P r o d u c e r s ,  P u b l i s h e r s ,  P o l i t i c a l  P r e s s u r e s  (1960).
12. 2 Hearings 811-39 (testimony of the Metropolitan Route Dealers’ Association). Tort 
litigation over the agency or independent contractor status of “newspaper boys” has been occurring 
with increasing frequency. For tort purposes, the degree of control exercised by newspapers over 
their delivery boys has led to more and more courts applying respondeat superior. See generally 
Annot., 52 A.L.R. 2d 287 (1957); Annot., 53 A.L.R. 2d 183 (1957); Note, The Independent 
Contractor Status o f  Newspaper Carriers: Some Antitrust Questions,2 V a lp .  L. R ev . 157 (1967). 
For antitrust purposes, at least, the Supreme Court seems willing to treat newsboys and route 
dealers as independent businessmen entitled to run thejr own business and set their own prices. See 
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 389 U.S. 910 (1968).
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that their under-age “independent contractors” are not even entitled to 
minimum-wage law benefits, there can be little doubt that overall wage 
costs have increased significantly.13
Heavy reliance upon advertising for revenue has also influenced the 
decline of the total number of newspapers. It is presently estimated that 
up to 70 per cent of the revenue of most newspapers is realized from 
advertising revenues.14 One estimate has been made that the subscription 
rate for most newspapers does not even cover the cost o f the paper 
comprising the newspaper purchased.15 The discerning reader of almost 
any daily newspaper may already have realized this fact of modern 
newspaper publishing simply by glancing at the daily offering served up 
for a dime. Many dailies are 70 per cent advertising, and the cynic might 
suggest that newspapers are not “news” papers; rather, they are 
“advertising” papers with news features inserted here and there. Even the 
30 per cent of a modern daily paper devoted to “news” cannot justify 
calling a newspaper a “news” paper unless one includes comic strips, 
advice to the lovelorn, canned editorials, and the remaining smorgasbord 
of “features” within the definition of “news.” 16
13. The average wage of production workers in the newspaper industry has risen from $2.88 
per hour in 1960 to $3.44 per hour in 1966. S ta t is t ic a l  A b s trac t o f th e  U nited S ta te s  227 
(1967). In the Senate subcommittee hearings, there seemed to be little debate about the claims of 
non-production workers, particularly reporters, that they are woefully underpaid. I Hearings 416­
25 (statement of B. McNamara); 1 Hearings 389 (statement of Prof. VV. L. Rivers). There was 
considerable dispute as to the exact relationship of wages and labor practices to the vitality of the 
newspaper industry. See e.g., I Hearings 196 (statement of L. M. Loeb). On this question the 
ANPA presented a statement prepared initially for a 1963 house antitrust subcommittee investiga­
tion of the newspaper industry and entitled: Newspapers 1963. Those House hearings were mys­
teriously aborted and no trace of the proceedings has ever been found. 3 Hearings 1415-16. The 
unions vigorously protested the allegations that exhorbitant wages and archaic union practices have 
contributed to the demise of newspapers. 3 Hearings 1244-52 (statement of ITU); 2 Hearings 936-53 
(statement of Prof. H. Kelber); 1 Hearings 387-408 (statement of Prof. VV. L. Rivers). Perhaps the 
only conclusion that can be drawn from this phase of the testimony is that one cannot place much 
value on the self-serving statements by both sides in protracted disputes in the newspaper industry. 
Labor relations in the industry are medieval, and there is a general need for an objective 
investigation of labor relations practices by both management and the unions. See generally 2 
Hearings 953-87 (statement of J. R. Malone).
14. In 1945, 51.5% of newsprint consumption by newspapers went for advertising and 48.5 
went for “other content.” By 1966,61.7% of newspaper newsprint consumption went for advertising 
and 38.3% went for “other content.” S t a t i s t i c a l  A b s t r a c t  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  517 (1967). 
See also Id. at 518 (Newspapers—circulation and receipts: 1958 and 1963).
15. See note 11 supra.
16. See 1 Hearings 322-23 (statement of Ben. Bagdikian); C om m , o n  F re e d o m  o f t h e  P r e s s ,  
A  F r e e  a n d  R e s p o n s ib le  P r e s s  52-59 (1947); Engberg, A Free and Responsible Press: Where Are 
They Now?, T h e  C e n t e r  M a g .  22 (1967). It has been said that, “ [J]ournalism has shifted emphasis 
from information to entertainment, from objective debate on vital issues to partisan propaganda, 
from enlightenment to comic strips.” K re b s , T h e  N e w s p a p e r  I n d u s t r y ,  T h e  S t r u c t u r e  o f  
A m e r ic a n  I n d u s t r y  526-27 (3d ed. 19bl).
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Reliance upon advertising revenue has a more invidious effect, 
however, than that of causing'the reader eyestrain as he hunts for the 
news and feature columns in the daily newspaper. A “news” paper’s 
success in obtaining high advertising revenue is directly linked with the 
size of the newspaper’s circulation. The paper with a large circulation 
can offer lower line rates per customer exposure, since the cost of setting 
up the advertising is spread over a much larger base. Increments in 
printing additional copies o f the same advertising do not entail 
additional large expenditures, since the only added costs are more ink 
and newsprint and additional press tim e.17 In some respects, the 
interrelationship of circulation and advertising makes the newspaper 
industry an industry of increasing returns. In the words of Henry 
Carter Adams, an industry of increasing returns is one where the 
“increment of product from an expending enterprise is greater than the 
increment of capital and labor required to secure its expansion.” 18 
Consequently, a competitor with a smaller circulation is at an inherent 
competitive disadvantage, particularly with national advertisers, since 
his use of mechanical equipment is less efficient and his base for 
allocation of advertiser cost is narrower. Moreover, smaller circulation 
and necessarily higher advertising rates make the smaller competitor less 
attractive to the advertiser, since the advertiser’s cost per potential
One of the underlying assumptions often stated in favor of S. 1312 is the proposition that local 
affairs will be better served by two contending editorial viewpoints rather than one. The assumption 
is based upon the premise that local newspapers cover local news and provide local citizens with in­
depth information about major problems facing the community. Aside from a few noteworthy 
exceptions, this premise is patently false, since: most “news” in local papers is provided by national 
wire services; most editorial comment is provided by nationally syndicated columnists or canned 
editorials; and the balance of non-advertising material is directed at entertaining rather than 
informing, by providing glimpses at the future through daily horoscopes for the idealists and racing 
forms for the realists, advice to the lovelorn and beauty hints for the lonely, sporting news for those 
who gain vicarious pleasure from identifying with athletes, comics for those who can’t read, and free 
advertising or adulation for those local citizens recognized as the local captains of industry or the 
commercial establishment. The gradual concentration and reliance of the industry upon advertising 
for revenue, thereby causing a shift to reliance upon the use of material that sells newspapers, bears a 
striking resemblance to the evolution of the radio and television industry. See Cox and Johnson, 
Broadcasting In America and the FCC’s License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma Case Study 
(Mimeo 1968).
17. In 1951 John R. Malone wrote an incisive article exploring this peculiarity of newspaper 
competition. Economic-Technological Bases fo r  Newspaper Diversity, J o u r n a l i s m  Q. (Summer 
1951, reprinted in 4 Hearings 1770. Dr. Malone predicted that the inevitable consequence of the 
present form of newspaper competition and technology'would be further concentration of the 
industry. His analysis has been proven correct and his testimony before the Committee proved to be 
the most sophisticated and incisive testimony on the economic laws and consequences of newspaper 
competition. 2 Hearings 953-87. '
18. H. A d a m s, R e l a t i o n  o f t h e  S t a t e  t o  I n d u s t r i a l  A c t i o n  (1887).
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customer reached will necessarily increase. Consequently, heavy reliance 
upon advertising for revenue, the more efficient use of advertising dollars 
per exposure by advertisers, and the direct relationship between size of 
circulation and the efficiency of the use of advertising dollars have all 
been combined to give the larger circulation competitor an inherent 
advantage in the struggle for survival. It is therefore not surprising that 
the twentieth century has witnessed a gradual decline in the total number 
of daily newspapers, even though newspaper circulation and revenues 
have been steadily increasing.
Given the foregoing economic facts of newspaper competition, high 
capital costs, difficulty of achieving market acceptance, difficulties in 
establishing an efficient distribution system, and competition by other 
media, it is not unusual to expect that there are high barriers to new 
market entry in the newspaper business.19 In many areas those barriers 
have been made insuperable by the following facts: restrictive practices 
in the newsprint business;-10 acquisition by existing papers of used 
production equipment and the intangible assets of failing newspapers in 
order to keep them out of the market for potential newcomers;31 
restrictive practices in the sale of syndicated features and wire services'” 
pooling a chain newspaper’s resources to fight competition;23 and by the 
creation o f joint newspaper agencies whereby existing competitors form 
a new corporation to handle printing, distribution, advertising, and all 
other commercial operations of their newspapers through one corpora­
tion.24 The creation o f joint newspaper agency corporations has been
19. See Malone, supra note 17; 1 Hearings 41 (statement of Arthur B. Hanson); 2 Hearings 
788 (statement of W. D. Rinehart). While no empirical economic research has been done on this 
question, the decline of the total number of newspapers and the experience of new entrants with 
artificial, as well as inherent, barriers to entry justify the conclusion that entry barriers are high, 
particularly where there are existing competitors. See 2 Hearings 721-38 (statement of M. G. 
Dworkin); 1 Hearings 371-85 (statement of Hon. G. Stipe). Even established newspapers have 
difficulty in establishing a new newspaper in a different product market. See 1 Hearings 195-97 
(statement of L. M. Loeb).
20. See generally L. E l l i s ,  N e w s p r in t :  P r o d u c e r s ,  P u b l i s h e r s ,  P o l i t i c a l  P r e s s u r e s  
(1960); Note, Local Monopoly in the Daily Newspaper Industry, 61 Y a le  L. J. 948,959-66 (1952).
21. 2 Hearings 973-74 (statement of J. R. Malone); 1 Hearings 211 (statement of W. J. 
Farson).
22. United States v. Chicago Tribune—N.Y. News Syndicate, Inc., 5 T r a d e  R e g . R ep . 
U.45067 at 52, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also 1 Hearings 297-308, 315-18 (statement of N. Cher- 
niss).
23. 2 Hearings 915-35 (statement of Fred Martin); 3 Hearings 1307-43 (statement of ITU);
1 Hearings 281-95 (statement of Prof. B. W. Rucker); 2 Hearings 1022-34 (statement of E. 
Elfstrom).
24. 1 Hearings 328-69 (statement of J. Flynn); 2 Hearings 841 (statement of J. M. Cornwell);
1 Hearings 249 (statement of R. McDonald); 1 Hearings 83 (statement of E. Mecham); 2 Hearings 
634-81 (statement of J. H. Clinton).
108 V AN D ERB IL T L A W  R E V I E W  [V o l . 22
HeinOnline -- 22 Yand, L. Rev, 108 1968-1969
1968] LE G ISL AT IO N 109
done in the name of preserving independent editorial voices in commun­
ities where there is existing competition between regularly published 
newspapers. Since the first newspaper agency corporation was created in 
Albuquerque in 1928,25 27 other communities have seen the creation of  
agency arrangements.26 A significant portion of the industry is currently 
operating under agency operations.27
111. T h e  G e n e s is  o f  S. 1312
On January 4, 1965, the A ntitrust D ivision o f the Justice  
Department filed a civil antitrust suit to block the merger of the Arizona 
Daily Star and the Tucson Daily Citizen, the two daily newspapers in 
Tucson, Arizona.28 The suit also challenged the validity of the joint 
operating agreement by which the two papers had been conducting joint 
printing, advertising, and circulation operations since 1940. Similar 
joint operations exist in 21 other American cities, and the prospect that 
Antitrust Division success in Tucson would place the other joint 
operations in jeopardy was the primary factor which produced S. 1312.29 
The United States District Court for Arizona found the merger unlawful 
under section 7 of the Clayton Act and held that the 1940 joint operating 
agreement constituted monopolization in violation o f section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.30 The court specifically held: that the joint operation “con­
stitutes a price fixing, profit pooling and market allocation agreement 
illegal per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act;” that the defendants
25. For a history of joint agency operations in various parts of the country, see T assin, Daily 
Newspaper Semi Mergers: A Study o f  Separately Owned, Editorially Competitive Newspapers 
Published in Jointly Operated Printing Plants Under Unified Business Management, 1957 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, U. of Okla.). The Albuquerque, N.M., and El Paso, Tex., joint agency 
arrangements have served as models for many subsequent joint agency arrangements. See, e.g., 1 
Hearings 6 (statement of VV. Small).
26. Tassin, supra note 25.
27. Twenty-two cities, if Tuscon is included, have joint agency operations to varying degrees: 
Birmingham, Ala.; Tucson, Ariz.; San Francisco, Cal.; Miami, Fla.; Honolulu, Hawaii; Evansville 
and Fort Wayne, Ind.; Shreveport, La.; St. Louis, Mo.; Lincoln, Neb.; Albuquerque, N. M.; 
Columbus, Ohio; Tulsa, Okla.; Franklin—Oil City and Pittsburgh, Pa.; Nashville and Knoxville, 
Tenn.; El Paso, Tex.; Salt Lake City, Utah; Bristol, Va.; Charleston, W. Va.; and Madison, Wis. 
The ITU claimed joint a'gency operations exist in 25 cities. See 1 Hearings 135 (statement of the 
ITU). The ANPA claimed joint agencies exist in 22 cities. 1 Hearings 63 (statement of A. Hanson). 
One witness, Roy McDonald, president and publisher of the Chattanooga News—Free Press, broke 
up a joint agency in which his newspaper participated. 1 Hearings 249-63.
28. United States v. Citizen Publishing Co., 5 T r a d e  R e g . R ep . T|45,065, at 52, 58F (D. 
Ariz. 1965), decided, 280 F. Supp. 978 (1968), prob. jur. noted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3151 (U.S. Sept. 21, 
1968).
29. I Hearings 3 (statement of Hon. Carl Hayden (D-Ariz.)). See also 15 Senators A sk Law 
to Okay Agency Plan, E d i t o r  a n d  P u b l i s h e r ,  March 25,1967, at 10.
30. United States v. Citizen Publishing Co., 280 F. Supp. y78,994 (1968).
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“acquired monopoly power over the daily newspaper business in Tucson, 
in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act;” that the defendants com­
bined and conspired to monopolize interstate trade and commerce in 
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act; and that the government is 
“entitled to a decree directing divestiture of [the] Star and modification 
o f the operating agreement.”31
S. 1312 was introduced by fifteen senators—representing about all 
schools o f political thought currently found in the two major political 
parties and representing states where joint newspaper arrangements have 
been operating—approximately eight months before the Citizen 
Publishing Company decision was handed down by the district court.33 A 
cursory reading of the bill should demonstrate that the proponents of the 
legislation were not bashful about seeking an “exemption” approaching 
immunity.
Section 1 of the bill would allow the Act to be cited as the “Failing 
Newspaper Act.” Like “right to work” and “fair trade” legislation, the 
popular name for the bill is somewhat misleading. In the case of S. 1312, 
the popular name of the bill infers that many newspapers are failing, that 
their failure is due to inherent and uncontrollable economic factors, and 
that the bill will only exempt newspapers that are failing because of 
inherent and uncontrollable econom ic factors. The first inference 
assumes a fact that never has been proved,33 the second is patently false,34 
and the third is simply not true since the bill by definition applies to more 
than “failing newspapers.”35
Section 2 of the bill, the declaration of congressional policy, 
broadly states that it is the policy of the United States to preserve
31. Id. at 993. •
32. The district court filed its opinion January 31, 1968, and S. 1312 was filed March 16, 
1967.
33. If anything, the claims of the ANPA that the industry was never healthier and the future 
never brighter were clearly established by the hearings. The ANPA’s claims were made in a report 
issued by the ANPA two weeks after S. 1312 was filed. See ANPA, Daily Newspapers in 1966, 
Highlights of a Record Year (April 1967), reprinted in 1 Hearings 509-27. Essentially the same 
claims were made by the ANPA in 1963 in a massive report prepared for the mysterious House 
Antitrust Subcommittee Hearings on Newspapers in 1963. Although all records of the House 
hearings have disappeared, the ANPA published and distributed its statement at those hearings. 
ANPA, N e w s p a p e r s  1963 (1963), reprinted in 3 Hearings 1407-1546. The ITU also prepared a 
massive report for the 1963 House hearings: ITU, F e d e r a l  R e s p o n s ib i l i ty  f o r  a  F r e e  a n d  
C o m p e ti t iv e  P r e s s  (1963). reprinted in 3 Hearings 1235-1406.
34. See generally 2 Hearings 953-87 (statement of John R. Malone).
35. Section 3(6) of the proposed bill provides: “The term ‘failing newspaper’ means a 
newspaper publication whieh, regardless of its ownership or affiliations, appears unlikely to remain 
or become a financially sound publication.” The gap between failing and “unlikely to remain or 
become a financially sound publication” is equivalent to the gap between the incipiency standards of
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publication o f newspapers in any area where a joint operating 
arrangement or combination has been or may be entered into because of 
“economic distress.”36 The term “economic distress” is not used or 
defined elsewhere in the act and promotes confusion, since it implies that 
the bill embraces a broader range of newspapers in trouble than that 
covered by the popular name of the bill found in section 1. Moreover, the 
legal status of the legislative declaration of policy is unclear. If the 
affirmative effect of a statutory declaration of policy is clear it is of aid 
in determining the substantive scope and purpose of the statute.37 The 
substantive scope and purpose of S. 1312, in light of this declaration of 
policy and the exemption sections, is to cut as wide a swath of antitrust 
immunity as possible for newspaper combinations formed under the 
conditions stated in section 4 of the bill. But the negative implications of 
the statutory declaration of policy are less clear. One implication of 
section 2 of the proposed bill is that a court faced with the question of 
whether state antitrust and special newspaper industry laws could be 
applied to a newspaper combination formed pursuant to S. 1312 would, 
in all likelihood, hold that the strong affirmative declaration of policy 
found in section 2 evidences a congressional intent to pre-empt 
conflicting state legislation.38 If such proves to be the case, S. 1312 would 
not only override the application of most major federal antitrust laws, 
but would also remove the application of state antitrust policy to 
anticom petitive newspaper arrangements formed within a state’s 
borders. One wonders why several of the sponsors, normally super­
sensitive to “states’ rights,” were willing to introduce a bill so obviously 
destructive of independent state antitrust policy.
Sections 3 and 4 of the proposed bill, the definition section and the 
operative exemption section, are the heart of the bill and are so closely
the Clayton Act and the achievement standards of the Sherman Act. Compare Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), with United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). 
For an examination of the various definitions of the failing company defense, see Low, The Failing 
Company Doctrine: An Illusive Economic Defense Under Section 7 o f  the Clayton Act, 35 
F o r d h a m  L. R ev . 425,437-42 (1967). .
36. Seetion 2 of the proposed bill provides: “ In the public interest of maintaining the historic 
independence of the newspaper press in all parts of the United States, it is hereby declared to be the 
public policy of the United States to preserve the publication of newspapers in any city, community 
or metropolitan area where a joint operating arrangement or combination has been or may be 
entered into beeause of economic distress.”
37. Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 
359 U.S. 236 (1959); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538
(1945); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
38. 2 Hearings 892-906 (statement of Hon. Phil Hansen). See generally J. F l y n n ,  
F e d e r a l i s m  a n d  S t a t e  A n t i t r u s t  R e g u l a t i o n  109-200 (1964).
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intertwined as to require joint examination. Section 3 (1) of the Act 
defines the words “antitrust law” to include the Federal Trade 
Commission Act and each statute defined by section 4 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act as an “Antitrust Act.”39 Section 4 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act defines “antitrust laws” as including the 
Sherman Act,40 the FTC Act,41 the Clayton Act42 including its pre- 
Norris-LaGuardia restrictions against labor unions,43 the Wilson Tariff 
Act,44 the Robinson-Patman Act Amendments to the Clayton Act,45 and 
the Celfer-Kefauver amendments to section 7 of the Clayton Act.46 The 
dimensions of the exemption must be measured against all the major 
federal antitrust laws, since section 4 states: “ It shall not be unlawful 
under any antitrust law for any person to propose, enter into, perform or 
enforce,” an arangement or combination exempted by the Act under the 
conditions stated for the exemption.47
The remaining definitions follow the same expansive and all- 
inclusive course. “Newspaper owner” is defined to mean “any person 
who owns or controls directly, or indirectly through separate or 
subsidiary corporations, one or more newspaper publications;”48 
“person” is defined to include any individual, corporation, partnership,
39. Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act does not define “Antitrust Act” but does 
define “Antitrust Acts,” 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1964). The definition may not include the Robinson- 
Patman Act and the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments to § 7 oftheClayton Act since § 4 refers to 
the Clayton Act as originally enacted in 1914 and does not incorporate its subsequent amendments. 
It might even be argued that the Robinson-Patman and Celler-Kefauver amendments to the Clayton 
Act are intentionally excluded since another section of the 1938 statute, defining acts to regulate 
commerce, expressly ineludes “ [a]ll acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto.” 15 
U.S.C. § 44 (1957). Express inclusion in one section would indicate an intent to exclude from a 
similar and companion section. Since newspaper joint agencies and newspaper mergers raise serious 
Clayton Act § 7 questions and many newspapers charge discriminatory advertising rates, it seems 
clear that the proponents of S. 1312 intended to add the Robinson-Patman Act and the Celler- 
Kefauver amendments to § 7 of the Clayton Act. The ambiguity should be removed, however, if the 
bill is adopted.
40. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964).
41. 38 Stat. 717 (1914), asamended, 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1964).
42. 38 Stat. 730 (1914), asamended, 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1964).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 52(4) (1964).
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1964).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 13(1964).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
47. Emphasis added. Section 4 of S. 1312 provides: “ It shall not be unlawful under any 
antitrust law for any person to propose, enter into, perform, or enforce the provisions of any 
contract, agreement, or arrangement for any newspaper combination or any joint newspaper 
operating arrangement if, at the time at which such contract, agreement, or arrangement is 
proposed or entered into, not more than one of the newspaper publications affected by such 
combination or operating arrangement is a publication other than a failing newspaper.”
48. S. 1312, § 3(4).
HeinOnline -- 22 Yand, L. Rev, 112 1968-1969
1968] LE G IS L A T IO N 113
association or other juridical person organized under or recognized by 
any state or nation;49 and “newspaper publication” is defined to include 
a “publication produced on newsprint paper which is published in one or 
more issues weekly, and in which a substantial portion of the content is 
devoted to the dissemination of news and editorial opinion.”50 Included 
among those who may avail themselves of the bill, therefore, is any 
individual or legal entity owning or controlling, no matter how 
indirectly, a newspaper printed at least once per week.
The key definitions of the bill are “newspaper combinations,” “joint 
operating arrangments,” and “failing newspaper,” since the exemption 
is conditioned upon “not more than one of the newspaper publications 
affected” by the arrangement being a “publication other than a failing 
newspaper” and is limited to a “newspaper combination” or “joint 
newspaper operating arrangement” as defined by the Act.51 The peculiar 
negative phrasing of the condition needed to activate the exemp­
tion—that not more than one of the newspapers be other than a 
failing newspaper—is somewhat confusing, since it seems to infer that 
combinations and arrangements may only be made by one non-“failing 
newspaper” and one or more “failing newspapers,” but not by two or 
more “failing newspapers” without a non-“failing newspaper” being 
party to the combination or arrangement. The confusion should be 
attributed to poor draftsmanship rather than evil design, since it seems 
apparent that the drafters at least intended to foreclose the possibility of 
the bill being used as a device for mergers by two or more healthy 
newspapers through the medium of a “failing newspaper.”52
The conditioning of a merger and joint operating arrangement upon 
only the status or lack of status of a “failing newspaper” seems to 
incorporate into the bill the failing company defense developed in 
Clayton Act section 7 cases. The definition of “failing newspaper,” 
however, is significantly broader than the vague definitions of that term 
which have been developed in antitrust lore.53 Section 3 (6) of the
49. S. 1312, § 3(7).
50. S. 1312, § 3(5).
51. S. 1312, § 4 .
52. 1 Hearings 78 (statement of A. Hanson).
53. Low, supra note 35 at 437-42; Hale & Hale,. Failing Firms and the Merger Provisions o f
the Antitrust Laws, 52 Ky. L.J. 597 (1964); Dept, of Justice, Antitrust Div. Merger Guidelines, 
T r a d e  R e g . R e p o r t s  (No. 363, June 3, 1968). T h e  Merger Guidelines adopt the following 
standards:
“A merger which the Department would otherwise challenge will ordinarily not be challenged if 
(i) the resources of one of the merging firms are so depleted and its prospects for rehabilitation so 
remote that the firm faces the clear probability of a business failure, and (ii) good faith efforts by the 
failing firm have failed to elicit a reasonable offer of acquisition more consistent with the purposes
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proposed bill defines “ failing newspaper” to mean “a newspaper 
publication which, regardless of its ownership or affiliations, appears 
unlikely to remain or become a financially sound publication.” The 
definition broadens the “failing company” defense, if it is a defense,54 by: 
(1) importing an incipiency test into the definition; (2) equating verbiage 
foreign to the defense, “unlikely to become or remain financially sound,” 
with the concept of failing; (3) excluding consideration of the other assets 
of the owners or its affiliates; (4) excluding consideration of those factors 
contributing to the “ financial” un-“soundness” o f the “ failing” 
newspaper; and (5) excluding investigation into the anticompetitive 
effects of one firm rather than another acquiring the failing firm.55 In 
light of such a definition it is generous to call the bill “The Failing 
Newspaper Act;” it is dangerous to think that the bill is designed to 
preserve the struggling and crusading editor of yesteryear whose only 
devotion is to the non-commercial aspects of journalism.56 It is ridicu­
lous to think that the bill is anything other than an open invitation to 
further concentrate an already over-concentrated industry, thereby 
destroying the few remaining independent editorial voices.
The danger of the bill’s vague and loophole-ridden definition of 
“failing newspaper” becomes apparent upon examining the dimensions 
of the exemption from all federal antitrust legislation created by the 
merger and joint operating arrangement definitions in sections 3 (2) and 
3 (3). “ Newspaper com binations” are defined as the merger or
of Section 7 by a firm which intends to keep the failing firm in the market. The Department regards 
as failing only those firms with no reasonable prospect of remaining viable; it does not regard a firm 
as failing merely because the firm has been unprofitable for a period of time, has lost market 
position or failed to maintain its competitive position in some other respect, has poor management, 
or has not fully explored the possibility of overcoming its difficulties through self-help.
“ In determining the applicability of the above standard to the acquisition of a failing division 
of a multi-market company, sueh factors as the difficulty in assessing the viability of a portion of a 
company, the possibility of arbitrary accounting practices, and the likelihood that an otherwise 
healthy company can rehabilitate one of its parts, will lead the Department to apply this standard 
only in the clearest of circumstances.”
54. See generally Connor, Section 7 o f  the Clayton Act: The "Failing Company” Myth, 49 
Geo. L.J. 84 (I960).
55. See United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654 (1962); Merger Guidelines, supra note 53.
56. Many newspapers are a part of a much larger chain or conglomerate corporation. For 
example, the ITU reported in 1963 the vast holdings of the Chandler, Hearst and Nevvhouse 
interests spreading across all forms of communications and related industries. See 3 Hearings 1276­
1307. Professor Rucker described the growth of newspaper chains and newspaper ownership of A M 
and FM broadcasting stations and television stations. I Hearings 283. The general shift from 
performing the task of transmitting information to the role of entertaining is further evidence of the 
demise of the crusading editor of yesteryear. See note 16 supra. There are still some around, 
hov/ever. For a particularly good example, see the testimony of Eugene Cervi, editor and publisher 
ofCervi’s Rocky Mountain Journal, I Hearings 25-41.
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consolidation of two or more newspaper owners, or the acquisition by 
one newspaper owner, directly or indirectly, of one or more newspaper 
owners by stock or asset acquisitions in whole or part. One can only 
speculate as to why the draftsmen felt compelled to include a merger 
provision in a bill purportedly designed to save joint operating 
arrangements. The heavy involvement of some chain newspapers in joint 
operating arrangements57 and the protection of consummated mergers 
between newspapers in many communities, bringing total control under 
one hand, seem to be the prime reasons. The retroactive effect of the bill58 
and the phrasing of the exemption lend support to this speculation, since 
the legality of the merger is to be judged “at the time at which such 
contract, agreement, or arrangement is proposed or entered into.” 
Consequently, the doctrine of U nited S ta tes  v. £ ./. Dupont de Nem ours  
& C o .,59 permitting attack upon a merger many years after its 
consummation, would not be available for attacking newspaper mergers 
if the merger met the lax standards of S. 1312 at the time it was pro­
posed or entered into. Thus, subsequent changes in market conditions, 
the rehabilitation of the failing firm, technological changes making it 
possible for a second and independent paper to exist in the same market, 
and the anticompetitive effects of the merger occurring in subsequent 
years could not lift the veil of antitrust immunity if at the time the 
merger was “proposed or entered into[,] not more than one of the 
newspaper publications affected by such combination or operating 
arrangement is a publication other than a failing newspaper.”
57. For example, the Scripps-Howard chain is involved in joint agency arrangements in 
Albuquerque, N. M.; El Paso, Tex.; Evansville, Ind.; Birmingham, Ala.; Knoxville, Tenn.; 
Columbus, Ohio; and Pittsburgh, Pa. 1 Hearings 265 (statement of J. Howard). Merger trends in 
the newspaper industry are a substantial cause for concern. For a survey of recent events, see 
Flackett, Newspaper Mergers: Recent Events in Britain and the United States, 12 A n t i t r u s t  
B u l l .  1033 (1967).
58. S. 1312, § 5 provides: “(a) Any civil action in any district court of the United States in 
which a final judgment or decree has been entered, under which a newspaper combination or a joint 
newspaper operating agreement has been held to be unlawful under any antitrust law shall be 
reopened and reconsidered upon application made to such court within ninety days after the date of 
enactment of this Act by any party to the contract, agreement, or arrangement by which such 
combination or operating agreement was placed in effect, whether or not such party was a party to 
such action. Upon the filing of any such application with respect to any such action, any final 
judgment or decree theretofore entered therein shall be vacated by the court. The provisions of 
section 4 shall apply to the determination of such action by such court upon such reconsideration,
(b) The provisions of section 4 shall apply to the determination of any civil or criminal action 
pending in any district court of the United States on the date of enactment of this Act in which it is 
alleged that any such combination, or any such operating agreement, is unlawful under any antitrust 
law.” .
59. 353 U.S. 586 (1957). See generally The Backward Sweep Theory and the Oligopoly 
Problem 32 ABA A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 306 (1967) (special report to the ABA Antitrust Law 
Subcommittee on § 7 of the Clayton Act).
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“Joint newspaper operating arrangement” is defined to allow any 
or all combined activity and to involve every commercial aspect of the 
newspaper business. The definition sanctions combined activity for any 
one or combination of the following aspects o f newspaper publication: 
(1) “joint or common facilities for publication;” (2) “unified operations 
for the performance of one or more of the following functions: printing, 
distribution, advertising and circulation solicitation, and bookkeeping;” 
and (3) “joint or common establishment of advertising rates, circulation 
rates, and revenue distribution.”60 In effect, therefore, “joint newspaper 
arrangements” is so defined by the bill as to permit a partial or total 
merger o f all commercial phases of newspaper operations without the 
necessity of a formal merger, if at the time the arrangement “is proposed 
or entered into, not more than one of the newspaper publications affected 
by such combination or operating arrangement is a publication other 
than a failing newspaper.” The dimensions o f the exemption approach 
total immunity from antitrust liability, since the operative language of 
the exemption states: “ It shall not be unlawful under any antitrust law 
for any person to propose, enter into, perform, or enforce the provisions 
o f any  contract, agreement, or arrangement for any  newspaper 
combination or any joint newspaper operating arrangement. . . .”61 If 
the word “any” is given its normal meaning and the definitions of “joint 
newspaper operating arrangement,” “newspaper combination,” and 
“antitrust laws” are followed, it is readily apparent that the exemption is 
one of total immunity from antitrust liability rather than the limited 
exemption the sponsors claimed for the bill.
Following in the footsteps o f other special interest legislation,62 S. 
1312 proposes to exempt previous transactions from antitrust liability. 
Quite simply, S. 1312 provides that all final judgments and decrees in 
civil cases against “newspaper combinations” and “joint newspaper 
operating arrangements” holding them to be unlawful under any 
antitrust law shall be “reopened and reconsidered” upon application o f a 
party to the arrangement or combination and its validity shall be 
readjudicated under S. 1312.63 Pending civil and criminal actions against 
“newspaper combinations” and “joint newspaper operating arrange­
ments,” where it is alleged that the combination or arrangement is un­
60. S. 1312, § 3(3).
61. S. 1312, § 4 (emphasis added).
62. See. e.g.. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(2) (Supp. 1967) (Bank Merger Act amendment of 1966). 
One court has considered the impact of the retroactive application of the statute. See United States 
v. Hirst Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 5 T ra d e  R e g . R ep . (1968 Trade Cas.) U 72,332, at 84,903 (E.D. 
fy . Dec. 29, 1967).
63. S. 1312, § 5 .
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lawful under “any antitrust law,” are to be adjudged under the 
standards of S. 1312 as well. By making S. 1312 retroactive, the 
proponents of the measure raise several complicated constitutional 
issues, as well as the unpopular spector of special interest legislation. The 
most immediate constitutional issues, aside from the general due process 
questions raised by retroactive legislation, are whether the legislation 
violates the general principle of separation of powers by reopening 
litigated judgments and whether the legislation deprives litigants of due 
process by destroying vested causes of action and rights vested pursuant 
to litigated and final judgments.64 While extended discussion o f these 
issues will not be attempted here, suffice it to say that the legislative 
process is already suspected by many to be the bailiwick of special 
interests. Passage of retroactive legislation for the obvious benefit of  
special interests only confirms such suspicions.
S. 1312 presents a number of antitrust law and constitutional law 
issues, as the above brief outline points out. Thus, even though the 
process of analyzing the bill may be a rewarding method for reviewing 
several areas of substantive law, the merit of S. 1312 is that it forces one 
to grapple with vital matters of public policy and the future of the 
expanding communications media. The hearings on S. 1312 proved to be 
of major public significance, since they revealed a massive amount of 
substantive information concerning the state of the communications 
industry in general and newspapers in particular that heretofore has been 
beyond public notice.
IV.  T he  H e a r i n g s  o n  S. 1312
The hearings on S. 1312 raised several major issues with regard to 
competition in the newspaper business. The key question was the 
recurring issue of whether the bill would grant immunity to newspaper 
mergers and joint operating arrangements permitting predatory anti­
competitive activity, or whether the bill would only amount to a limited
1968] L E G IS L A T IO N  117
64. The closest case to the issues presented by S. 1312 is United States v. First Nat’l Bank & 
Trust Co., 5 T r a d e  R e g . R ep . (1968 Trade Cas.) f  72,332, at 84,903 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 29,1967). The 
Bank Merger Act of 1966 provides that “Any merger, consolidation, acquisition of assets, or 
assumption of liabilities involving an insured bank which was consumated prior to June 17, 1963, 
the bank resulting from which has not been dissolved or divided and has not effected a sale or 
distribution of assets and has not taken any other similar action pursuant to a final judgment under 
the antitrust laws prior to the enactment of this A c t. . . , shall be conclusively presumed to have 
not been in violation of any antitrust laws other than Section 2 of the [Sherman Antitrust Act] 
. . . .” 12 U.S.C. ,§ 1828 (Supp. II, 1967). The District Court in First N at’l Bank & Trust avoided 
the constitutional issues by holding that the litigation was not final when the Bank Merger Act was 
passed, even though a decree ordering divestiture had been entered.
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exemption for activity otherwise subject to antitrust attack, not 
including “predatory activity.” Senator Hayden, chief sponsor of the 
bill, took the position that the bill was an “exemption,” equivalent to the 
many exceptions heretofore enacted for regulated industries or other 
fields of economic endeavor where competition has been assumed or 
proved to be unworkable or impracticable.65 Senator Hayden’s position 
was supported by Arthur B. Hanson, general counsel of the American 
Newspaper Publisher’s Association (ANPA).66 Mr. Hanson cited as 
analogous exemptions from antitrust liability the Webb-Pomerene 
Export Trade Act,67 the Small Business Act of 1958,68 the Bank Merger 
Act of 1966,69 and exemptions for pooled television broadcasting rights 
in professional football.70 Others mentioned the McCarren-Ferguson 
exemption,71 exemptions for agricultural cooperatives, and the labor 
exemptions.72 Each of the exemptions cited are specifically limited either 
by being narrowly defined to cover a specific type of conduct or by being 
limited to extraterritorial effects, or by the fact that the particular 
industry is otherwise affirmatively regulated by federal or state 
administrative agencies. There is no limiting language on the scope of the 
exemption in S. 1312, nor is their any quid pro quo in the form of 
affirmative administrative regulation of predatory practices from price 
fixing to price discriminations in return for the gift o f antitrust 
immunity. The argument was made that the exemption extended only to 
the “act o f  com bining  by way of a joint arrangement or merger and the 
jointness o f the activities thereafter engaged in by the joint arrangement 
or the merged companies. . . . The activities  undertaken by the newly 
formed entity would remain subject to the antitrust laws just as the 
conduct of any other lawfully created entity is subject to the antitrust 
laws.”73 The simple answer to this proposition is that the bill immunizes
65. 1 Hearings 3-5,445-49 (statement of Senator Hayden (D-Ariz.)).
66. Mr. Hanson’s time was paid for by the AN PA, but his viewpoints, apparently, were not 
intended to represent the official views of the Association, 1 Hearings 60, a posture some members 
of the AN PA found both objectionable and confusing, 1 Hearings79.
67. 40Stat. 516 (\9\S), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1964). Seegenerally Pogue, Webb- 
Pomerene Export Trade Act, 33 A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 105 (1967).
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 631 et seq. (1964). See generally Schramm, Small Business, 33 A n t i t r u s t  
L.J. 94 (1967).
69. 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. 11, 1967). See generally Hammond, The Philadelphia Nat't 
Bank Doctrine—A Verification, 36 A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 13 (1967).
70. 75 Stat. 732 (1961), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-93 (Supp. 11, 1967). See generally 
Eppel, Professional Sports, 33 A n t i t r u s t  L. J. 69 (1967).
71. 59 Stat. 33 (1945), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964). 1 Hearings 77 (statement 
of P. Chumbris). See generally Myrter & Gorman, Insurance, 33 A n t i t r u s t  L. J. 28 (1967).
72. 1 Hearings 178-80 (statement of Prof. R. Day). See generally Noakes, Agricultural 
Cooperatives, 33 A n t i t r u s t  L.J. 7 (1967); Fried and Crabtree, Labor, Id. at 38.
73. 1 Hearings 190 (letter to the Committee by Prof. R. Day) (emphasis added).
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total merger or joint or common action for any or all commercial 
activity engaged in by a modern newspaper and contains no language 
limiting the scope of the exemption. Consequently; the argument that 
predatory activities pursuant to a joint arrangement or merger are not 
exempt from antitrust policy is incomprehensible, since the language 
providing for exemption makes any joint arrangement for unified 
activity embracing any or all commercial activity of the newspapers 
involved “n o t . . . unlawful under any antitrust law.”74
A second major issue before the committee was a determination of  
the economic health of the newspaper industry in general and of specific 
newspapers in particular. The debate generally raged in the realm of 
speculation and generalities, with few instances of specifics. Newspapers 
have been generally exempt from income reporting requirements,75 and, 
since most newspapers are close corporations and no annual reports to 
stockholders are issued , there is no general fund of information with 
regard to their financial affairs. Although several publishers made 
unsubstantiated pleas of poverty or of increasing cost pressures upon 
profit rates, the overall impact of the hearings established that most 
newspapers are exceptionally profitable, that newspapers operated on a 
joint arrangement basis are very profitable, and that monopoly town 
newspapers are extremely profitable.
Indeed, it would be hard to understand how the general economic 
health of the industry could be .other than good. Between 1945 and 1966, 
daily newspaper circulation increased by almost 11 million, the total 
number o f pages in an average daily newspaper almost doubled,76 and 
total newspaper revenues increased from 846 million dollars in 1939 to 
3,458 million dollars in 1958.77 Advertising revenues alone totalled 4,876 
million dollars in 1966.78 In an industry with a rapidly expanding 
customer market, high barriers to entry, and consistent and high gains in 
revenues it is difficult to believe that the industry in general is suffering 
from a case of economic malnutrition. Indeed, an American Newspaper 
Publisher’s Association report on the state of the industry in April, 1967, 
described “the unprecedented economic vigor of daily newspapers.”79 
The econom ic vigor o f jo in t agency and recently merged 
newspapers, perhaps the key factual issue before the committee, was
74. S. 1312, § 4.
75. 1 hearings 287-88 (statement of Prof. B. Rucker); 1 hearings 388 (statement of Prof. 
Rivers).
76. ANPA, Daily Newspapers in 1966 (April, 1967), published in 1 hearings 513-15.
77. 3 Hearings 1265 (statement of ITU).
78. ANPA, Daily Newspapers in 1966 (April, 1967),published in I Hearings 511.
79. Id. at 509-27.
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never clearly established. However, several witnesses produced evidence 
indicating the newspapers can be lucrative enough even to cause the drug 
industry to be envious. Prices paid for large newspapers80 and for small 
newspapers81 indicate that buyers believe newspapers are an exceptional 
investment. It was reported that a survey of a large daily, with an 
average circulation of 240,000, and a medium daily, with a circulation of
50,000, showed the former had before-tax profits of 3,296,179 dollars or 
a profit of 22 per cent of its total revenues, and that the latter had a 
.before tax profit of 27 per cent of revenues and an after-tax profit of 14 
per cent of revenues.82 The Times-Mirror Company, a diversified holding 
company which owns the Los Angeles Times and has “large interests in 
newspaper publishing, book publishing and commercial printing,”8-' 
showed 1963 revenues of 196,537,000 dollars on 165,162,000 dollars of 
total assets.84 The Sun Company, owners and operators o f daily 
newspapers in San Bernardino, California, and the acquired company in 
the aborted Times-Mirror merger case,85 had total assets of 4,551,261 
dollars and net income from its newspaper operations in 1964 that 
“exceeded 1,000,000 dollars.”86 The International Typographical Union 
reported that the Tucson Star and the Tucson Mirror, participants in a 
joint agency venture and partners in the merger attacked by the Antitrust 
Division87 which led to the introduction of S. 1312, showed profits of 
2,914,036 dollars on a total income of 8,170,780 dollars in 1963.8S
It seems clear that proponents of the proposed legislation did not 
carry the burden of establishing the central factual issue before the 
committee—that the newspaper industry in general or in particular cases 
is in ailing circumstances. If anything, the evidence submitted to the 
committee indicated a marked reluctance by newspaper owners to 
disclose detailed and independently audited profit statements and many
80. The Cleveland Plain Dealer was sold for $50 million and the New Orleans Times 
Picayune was sold for $42 million to the Newhouse chain. The Chandler interests paid $15 million 
for the San Bernardino Sun. 1 Hearings 115 (statement of the ITU).
81. A paper with 7,000 circulation in Athens, Georgia, was recently sold for $1.7 million. I 
Hearings 115 (statement of the ITU).
82. I Hearings 206 (statement of W. J. Farson).
83. United States v. Times-Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aJJ'dper curiam, 
390 U.S. 712 (1968). For a description of the Times Mirror Company’s “large holdings," see 3 
Hearings 1298-1301 (statement of the ITU).
84. 274 F. Supp. at 609. 1966 Profits of the Times-Mirror Company were reported to be 
$18,455,500. I Hearings 170 (statement of ITU).
85. 274 F. Supp. at 609.
86. Id.
87. United States v. Citizen Publishing Co., 280 F. Supp. 978 (D. Ariz. 1968).
88. 1 Hearings 153.
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witnesses indicated that profits in the newspaper industry and related 
enterprises are exceptionally high.89
The third major issue before the committee was whether competing 
newspapers could survive only in communities with over 650,000 
population and whether joint agency operations were the only means for 
maintaining two newspapers in communities with less than 650,000 
population. Several subsidiary issues were also involved: the cause of the 
demise of large urban dailies; the effects of newsprint and equipment 
manufacturer prices; the evolution of printing, data transmission and 
distribution technology; barriers to entry erected by restrictive wire 
service and syndicated column practices; concentration of ownership of 
other forms of communications media by newspaper owners; the growth 
of chains; and predatory practices by existing newspapers against actual 
and potential competitors.
No empirical research was produced to show the minimum market 
capable of supporting two independent and competing daily newspapers. 
Proponents of S. 1312 claimed 650,000 population as a minimum 
market for newspaper competition;90 opponents offered several instances 
of much smaller markets supporting competing dailies.91 Proponents 
offered several examples of large urban dailies failing in recent years;92 
opponents countered with allegations that the failures were due to poor 
management,93 failure to relate to citizens of the urban area,94 
conspiratorial arrangements to divide markets,95 illegal competitive 
tactics by larger competitors,96 or other conduct, thereby laying failure 
on factors other than inherent lack of economic support.97 Out of the
89. 1 Hearings 387-407 (statement of Prof. W. L. Rivers).
90. 1 Hearings 44 (statement of A. Hanson); 2 Hearings 883 (statement of J. Gallivan).
91. 1 Hearings 359 (statement of J. Flynn); 1 Hearings 371 (statement of G. Stipe); 1 
Hearings 291 (statement of Prof. B. Rucker).
92. 1 Hearings 47, 71 (statement of A. Hanson); 2 Hearings 592 (statement of G. O. 
Markuson).
93. 1 Hearings 308 (statement of B. Bagdikian); 1 Hearings 405 (statement of Prof. W. L. 
Rivers).
94. Id.
95. 1 Hearings 201 (statement of W. J. Forson); 1 Hearings 416 (statement of B. 
McNamara).
96. 1 Hearings 25 (statement of E. Cervi); 2 Hearings 915 (statement of F. J. Martin); 1 
Hearings 297, 315 (statement of N. Cherniss); 2 Hearings 634 (statement of J. H. Clinton); 2 
Hearings 841 (statement of J. M. Cornwell). See also Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F. 
2d 643 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957); Barber, Newspaper Monopoly In New Orleans: 
The Lessons fo r  Antitrust Policy, 24 La. L. R e v . 503 (1964).
97. Id. See also 2 Hearings 721 (statement Of M.G. Dworkin); 2 Hearings 989 (statement of 
W. Loeb). Cf. Greenspun v. McCarran, 105 F. Supp. 662 (D. Nev. 1952); Indiana Farmer’s Guide 
Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293 U.S. 268 (1934).
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welter of conflicting testimony some facts dearly emerged. No 
competent research has been done to establish a generally acceptable 
figure indicating where a natural monopoly newspaper market begins 
and a competitive market ends. Also it appeared that there is a shocking 
degree of concentration in the communications industry in the United 
States, and the government agencies—principally the Antitrust Division, 
FCC and FTC—have done little to prevent or undo the concentration 
which presently exists.98 Finally, it is evident that the newspaper industry 
in particular and the communications industry in general are rich 
sources of potential antitrust litigation in view of their concentrated 
structure and anticompetitive tactics reminiscent of the captains of 
industry of the nineteenth century.
The hearings before the Senate Antitrust and Monopoly 
Subcommittee proved to be a public service, the potential dimensions of 
which can be evaluated only from the hindsight provided by the passage
of time. It seems clear, however, that Senator Hart, the committee, the 
committee staff, and unwittingly the sponsors of S. 1312 have provided a 
wealth of heretofore unknown, and perhaps suppressed, information 
about the state of the Fourth Estate. The hearings evidently provided 
enough adverse information to cause even the most zealous servants of 
constituent interests to postpone further Senate action on S. 1312 in its 
present form for the remainder of this session of Congress. It will be a 
tragedy for freedom of speech and freedom of the press if government 
action is limited to a negative response of burying the bill in committee. 
The information revealed thus far indicates that the newspaper industry 
together with the other forms of communication media need further 
examination in the harsh glare of full publicity, and could use a healthy 
dose of competition, a remedy most of them are continually advocating 
for others but which few of them practice.
V . C o n c l u s i o n
The newspaper industry does have peculiar competitive problems. 
The interrelationship of circulation and advertising and the almost total 
dependence upon advertising revenue for economic success means that 
newspaper publishing is an industry of increasing return. The greater the 
circulation the more efficient the expenditure of advertising dollars, since 
the buyer of space reaches a greater number of readers and the seller of 
space need not make any additional expenditure of consequence once
98. See generally 3 Hearings 1276-96 (statement of ITU); I Hearings 281 (statement of Prof. 
B. Rucker).Seealso M. E r n s t , T h e  F ir s t  F r e e d o m  (1946).
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type and plate are set, to serve the larger circulation. Accordingly, once a 
significant circulation gap opens between competing daily newspapers, 
an irreversible trend is likely to set in, with advertisers going to the larger 
circulation newspaper, assuming rates are relatively competitive, to 
obtain the greatest efficiency in advertising expenditure. Consequently, 
the best method of preserving competing dailies, where they still exist, is 
to prevent the creation of a circulation gap of significant magnitude to 
start the snowballing effect of advertisers rushing to the paper with the 
largest circulation.
The cause of a circulation gap can arise from a myriad of factors. 
Superiority of product in the minds of the consuming public is, of 
course, the basic factor. Product superiority, however, do.es not 
necessarily arise from laudatory performance. The hearings disclosed 
that several newspapers gained a competitive edge by predatory 
practices, by leverage gained from the ownership of other forms of media 
in the same community, by exclusive contracts for syndicated features, 
by resources derived from other members of a chain of newspapers, by 
price discrimination, and by unfair competitive advantages with large 
advertisers. Insofar as preventing a gap from arising because of unfair 
competitive tactics or power gained from deeper economic resources, it 
would seem that judicial awareness of the interrelationship of advertising 
and circulation in newspaper competition could have a salutary effect, if 
a declining paper charged a larger competitor with an attempt to 
monopolize under section 2 of the Sherman Act." In effect, such a claim 
based on section 2 is a form of an “incipiency” charge,100 and judicial 
sensitivity to the advertising-circulation relationship to viable newspaper 
competition should minimize the degree of evidence necessary to prove 
an attempt to monopolize and minimize the degree of circulation gap 
necessary to establish a trend toward monopolization. Proof of a circu­
lation gap, or proof of a trend toward the creation of a circulation gap, 
plus minimal evidence of predatory conduct, unfair trade practices, price 
discrimination, or use of leverage from other product or geographic 
markets should be sufficient to establish an attempt to monopolize in 
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. Thus, in those cases where a 
circulation gap is accompanied by any factor extrinsic to the legitimate
99. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
100. See, e.g., Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957); Lorain 
Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948); 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927); Six Twenty-Nine 
Productions, Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1966); Packaged Programs, 
Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting, Inc., 255 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 1958); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence 
Fruit& Produce Bldg., 1952 Trade Cas. H 67,219 (1st Cir. 1952).
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competitive capabilities of the protagonists, the firm with a smaller 
circulation will have a potent weapon to deter the firm with a larger 
circulation from pushing its advantage too far.
Antitrust policy should also be vigilant in those cases where a firm 
with a smaller circulation is losing the competitive struggle because of its 
own- internal deficiencies. Acquisition by a competitor in the same 
market, rather than by new investors in the community or outside 
interests, can have undesirable effects. Where the competing paper has 
acquired its competitor, future market entry is usually foreclosed, excess 
machinery and equipment are either junked or removed from the scene 
as far as possible to prevent their acquisition by potential local 
competitors, combination rates are employed, and the community is left 
with a single source for editorial viewpoints and a single source of news 
from the printed media. If the acquiring firm also owns other forms of 
media in the community, the economic, political, and social effects of the 
acquisition are compounded. At the very least, antitrust policy should 
prohibit a single newspaper in a community from owning other forms of 
competing media, prevent the sale of excess equipment outside the 
community, and prevent the use of combination rates.
Beyond this, Congress should investigate means of breaking the 
advertising-circulation relationship, which gives great economic impetus 
to the growth of a newspaper, enabling it to gain the upper hand in 
circulation. Factors responsible for newspaper costs, particularly 
newsprint and equipment costs, contribute heavily to the need for 
newspapers to rely upon advertising for revenue. Paring newsprint and 
equipment costs could alleviate the pressure to rely upon advertising 
revenues to a limited extent. But a frontal attack must be made upon the 
interrelationship of advertising and circulation, either by legislation 
easing the standards for establishing monopolization in newspaper cases 
or by mandatory equalization of advertising costs per exposure where 
the disparity in circulation reaches a point that makes survival of the 
newspaper with the smaller circulation marginal. Without some kind of 
remedy for the advertising-circulation syndrome, continued concen­
tration in the newspaper industry is unavoidable.101
101. 4 Hearings 1770; 2 Hearings 953 (statement of J.R. Malone). Dr. Malone advances sev­
eral proposals aimed at alleviating the anticompetitive effects of a circulation gap which drains a 
smaller competitor of advertising revenue because of the inter-relationship of advertising and cir­
culation. If Congress is seriously interested in preserving competing and independent editorial 
voices, it should investigate the merits of Dr. Malone’s proposals and enact legislation which would 
regulate the revenue pressure caused by a circulation gap, rather than passing measures like S. 
1312 which would eliminate all competition. In essence, a circulation advantage permits price 
discrimination in advertisifig rates and it is usually compounded by volume discounts and price
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Finally, Congress must forcefully assert itself as guardian of the 
public interest. The executive and administrative agencies charged with 
this responsibility, particularly the FCC,102 have failed to carry out 
effectively their responsibility. In part, the failure of executive and 
administrative agencies to preserve competition and prevent 
concentration in the communications media is attributable to the 
political power of the communications media, which in turn has 
intimidated Congress. Ultimately, Congress, with its hands on the purse 
strings and its political leverage on executive and administrative 
agencies, must bear the responsibility for the present state of the 
communications industry. Future efforts to restore competition to the 
industry must begin with the rejection of S. 1312 and a congressional 
willingness to provide adequate appropriations to executive and 
administrative agencies. It is not too much to say that the time has come 
for Congress to show some intestinal fortitude and protect the linchpin 
of any democratic society from private domination by insuring a free, 
competitive, and independent multitude of voices in the communications 
industry. The electors should settle for no less; our future as a 
democratic society is dependent in part upon a courageous and 
meaningful stand by Congress in favor of decentralizing the 
communications industry.103
discrimination between national, local, and classified advertising. A t’the very least, the courts 
should not follow the simplistic view of the economics of newspaper competition implicit in Times- 
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). See generally Barber, Newspaper 
Monopoly in New Orleans: The Lessons Far Antitrust Policy, 24 L a . L . R e v . 503 (1964).
102. See generally Cox & Johnson, supra note 16; G o u l d e n , M o n o p o l y  (1968); Drew, Is the 
F.C.C. Dead?, T h e  A t l a n t i c  M o n t h l y , July, 1967 at 29; Johnson, The Media Barons and the 
Public Interest, T h e  A t l a n t i c  M o n t h l y , June, 1968 at 43; Fiackett, supra note 57.
103. See generally B .W . R u c k e r , supra n o te  2 ; Symposium, Antitrust and Monopoly 
Policy in the Communications Industry, 13 A n t it r u s t  Bu l l . 871 (1968).
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